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Abstract—The rate regions of many variations of the standard
and wire-tap channels have been thoroughly explored. Secrecy
capacity characterizes the loss of rate required to ensure that
the adversary gains no information about the transmissions.
Authentication does not have a standard metric, despite being
an important counterpart to secrecy. While some results have
taken an information-theoretic approach to the problem of
authentication coding, the full rate region and accompanying
trade-offs have yet to be characterized. In this paper, we provide
an inner bound of achievable rates with an average authentication
and reliability constraint. The bound is established by combining
and analyzing two existing authentication schemes for both noisy
and noiseless channels. We find that our coding scheme improves
upon existing schemes.
I. INTRODUCTION
Authentication, or the ability to verify the identity of the
sender of received transmissions, is crucial in secure commu-
nications. It is especially important in the wireless channel
where malicious parties have easy access to all nodes and
can attempt to intercept messages and impersonate legitimate
senders. While cryptographic authentication methods are very
practical, they are limited to computational complexity as the
basis for security. The first information theoretic analysis of
authentication was done by Simmons [1] for the noiseless
channel in which it was shown that an opponent’s attack
success probability is lower bounded by 2−nκ/2 when the
legitimate parties share a key of length nκ.
Similar to coding for secrecy in the wire-tap channel, an
authentication constraint can be added to a channel code. In
[2], Maurer likened authentication to a binary hypothesis test
for whether a received message is authentic versus inauthentic.
Naturally then, an authentication code would have a decoder
that groups certain observations as authentic and others as
inauthentic in addition to mapping to possible codewords.
A larger authentic set would allow for an increase in rate
since fewer observations would be thrown out as inauthentic,
but would allow an adversary to more easily send messages
that would be falsely authenticated. It is because of this that
the additional constraint on the code should lead to a trade-
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off between rate and authentication capabilities in our inner
bound.
In [3], Lai et. al. presented a code for noisy channels with
authentication capabilities and concluded that if the main chan-
nel is not less noisy than the adversary, it is possible to limit
the attack success probability to 2−nκ with a shared key K of
length nκ. Although it was shown that the communication rate
is unaffected if nκ is small, their analysis is only concerned
with cases where nκ is a constant independent of n. Gungor
and Koksal [4] explored a more general problem and presented
an inner bound on the achievable rate with error and erasure
exponents for impersonation and substitution attacks both with
and without a shared key. We consider the model of [3], while
not requiring a constant nκ and determine an inner bound
that improves upon Gungor and Koksal’s coding scheme. Of
interest is that the coding scheme can be decomposed into
two separate coding schemes, one for source authentication
and one for channel authentication. A direct proof is given for
the region while the converse is left for future work. If the
converse were true, it would prove that authentication under
the operational requirements is a limited resource, and that this
resource and the message rate must linearly share the channel’s
capacity.
Our contributions are as follows. First, for all DM-
ASC(t, q, 1), a substitution channel, defined in Section II-B,
we give an inner bound on the trade-off between the rate
r, the key rate κ, and the average type I error exponent α,
when the average probability of message error, , must go
to zero with block length n going to infinity. The average
type I error exponent is a measure of authentication ability
and is defined in Section II-C. It should be noted that this
measure of authentication subsumes both the “impostor” and
“substitution” attack. Our inner bound is characterized in terms
of (in principal) computable information theoretic measures
in the form of an inner bound. The derived region subsumes
the results of Lai et. al. [3] in which only an asymptotically
vanishing key rate is considered. The inner bound is also
a strict improvement over the bounds found in Gungor and
Koksal [4]. Our scheme benefits from higher communication
rates and less key leakage.
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Fig. 1: Channel Model
II. NOTATION, MODEL, AND METRICS
A. Notation
Random variables and their realizations will be denoted
by uppercase and lowercase letters, respectively. The support
set of a random variable and other sets are denoted by a
calligraphic font. An n-length sequence of random variables,
realizations, or sets will be denoted by superscript n. So, Xn
is a n-length sequence of random variables which may take
on values xn ∈ Xn. The probability X = x is denoted
Pr(X = x), or pX(x), and even p(x) when clear. The
probability of a set is written as pX(A) =
∑
x∈A p(x),
assuming A ⊆ X where the set will often be omitted from
the summation notation when it is clear, i.e.,
∑
x. The set
of all probability distributions on a certain set, say X , is
denoted by P(X ). Similarly, the set of probability distributions
of Y conditioned on X is denoted as P(Y|X ). The set
P(Y  X ) represents a special subset of P(Y|X ), where if
v ∈ P(Y  X ) for any y ∈ Y , there exists at most one x ∈ X
such that v(y|x) > 0. Note, for random variables X,Y, Z, if
pY |X ∈ P(Y  X ), then X, Y, Z form a Markov chain,
X c Y c Z. A superscript of ⊗n will denote the n-fold
product distribution of v.
The use of O will refer to the Bachmann-Landau notation.
When there is a range of possible values for O, we will use
=˙ to denote it. Throughout the paper, the order will only be
dependent on continuous functions of the cardinalities of the
support sets.
B. Model
Our authentication model consists of three parties. Alice,
a legitimate transmitter, wishes to authenticate her commu-
nications with Bob, a legitimate receiver, over a discrete
memoryless channel in the presence of Grı´ma, a malicious
adversary. Grı´ma has the ability to intercept Alice’s message
and send his own to Bob via a noiseless channel. His goal is
to have Bob accept his messages as if they were from Alice.
To aid in authentication, Alice and Bob share a secret key K
which is distributed uniformly over K := {1, . . . , 2nκ}.
When Alice wishes to communicate, she jointly encodes a
message M , distributed uniformly over M := {1, . . . , 2nr},
and the key K, as codeword Xn. The distribution of Xn is de-
fined by the encoder f ∈ P(Xn|M,K), where P(Xn|M,K)
is the set of all probability distributions over Xn conditioned
on M×K. Alice then transmits Xn to both Bob and Grı´ma.
The three parties are connected via a discrete memoryless-
adversarial substitution channel (DM-ASC) which consists of
three discrete memoryless channels, (t, q, t˜), and a Grı´ma-
controlled switch. The triple represents the channels from
Alice to Bob, Alice to Grı´ma, and Grı´ma to Bob, respectively,
while the switch controls Bob’s observations.
Note that for simplicity, we use the triple (t, q, t˜) instead of
the formal septuple (X ,Y,Z, X˜ , t, q, t˜), assuming that these
values specify X , Y, Z, X˜ by their non-zero indices. Fur-
thermore, we will assume for the remainder that X , Y, Z, X˜
are all discrete and finite. The channel is depicted in Figure
1.
When the switch is open, Bob will receive Alice’s trans-
mission over t. In other words, Y n|Xn will be distributed ac-
cording to t⊗n(yn|xn) := ∏ni=1 t(yi|xi) where t ∈ P(Y|X ).
When the switch is closed, Grı´ma first obtains Zn|Xn, then
determines Xˆn and transmits to Bob. We only consider (t, q, 1)
in which the channel from Grı´ma to Bob is noiseless, i.e.
X˜ = Y , as in [3], [4]. Thus, Y n|Xn will be distributed
according to ∑
zn
ψ(yn|zn)q⊗n(zn|xn),
where q ∈ P(Z|X ), and ψ ∈ P(Yn|Zn). Grı´ma is free to
choose any attack strategy, ψ, including ones modeled after the
standard impersonation and substitution attacks. Regardless of
the switch’s position, Bob receives Y n and either makes an
estimate of the message, M∗, or declares an intrusion, !, which
is determined by a decoder ϕ ∈ P(M∪ {!} |Yn,K).
C. Performance Metrics
Before presenting the performance metrics, we define an
authentication code.
Definition 1. A code is any pair (f, ϕ), where f ∈
P(Xn|M,K) and ϕ ∈ P(M∪{!} |Yn,K). The rate of (f, ϕ)
is n−1 log2 |M|, the block-length of (f, ϕ) is n, and the key
requirement of (f, ϕ) is n−1 log2 |K|.
The performance of the code is measured in two ways,
reliability and type I error. Reliability is measured by the
average probability of error over all keys and messages at
Bob, that is
εf,ϕ := |K|−1 |M|−1
∑
m,k
εf,ϕ(m, k) < , (1)
where  ∈ (0, 1) is a chosen constraint and
εf,ϕ(m, k) := 1−
∑
xn,yn
ϕ(m|yn, k)t⊗n(yn|xn)f(xn|m, k).
(2)
Type I error refers to the fact that authenticating is equivalent
to a binary hypothesis test where the null hypothesis is an in-
trusion and the alternate hypothesis is authenticity. Therefore,
a good code limits the average type I error by
ωf,ϕ := max
ψ∈P(Yn|Zn)
EZn,M,K [ωf,ϕ(ψ, z
n,m, k)] ≤ 2−na,
(3)
where
ωf,ϕ(ψ, z
n,m, k) :=
∑
yn
ψ(yn|zn)ϕ(M−{m} |yn, k). (4)
Definition 2. A code (f, ϕ) is called an (r, α, κ, , n)-average
authentication (AA) code for DM-ASC(t, q, 1) if the block-
length is n, the rate at least r, the key requirement at most
κ, it is reliable in that εf,ϕ <  and it satisfies the average
authenticity requirement:
ωf,ϕ < 2
−nα. (5)
Our study aims to determine what types of codes are
possible in the following sense.
Definition 3. A triple (a, b, c) is said to be achievable
for the DM-ASC (t, q, 1) if there exist a sequence of
{(ri, αi, κi, i, i)}∞i=1-AA codes (fi, ϕi) such that
lim
i→∞
|(ri, αi, κi, i, i)− (a, b, c, 0, i)|2 → 0.
The average authentication region (AAR) is then
CA(t, q, 1)
:= {(a, b, c) : (a, b, c) is achievable for DM-ASC(t, q, 1)} .
(6)
III. BACKGROUND
Before presenting the inner bound for the average authen-
tication region, we review existing schemes. First, we review
Lai’s [3] strategy and frame it in terms of information metrics
for ease of comparison. Next, we examine Simmons’ [1]
strategy for the noiseless channel and transform Gungor and
Koksal’s [4] inner bound into our terms.
A. Lai’s Strategy
In [3], Lai et. al. propose essentially using a code designed
for a wire-tapper channel, and sending the key as part of the
message. The specific code they proposed is optimal for their
limited scenario (key requirement → 0), but in light of the
forthcoming discussion, it is not optimal in ours.
Recognizing that the essence of the construction is to
transmit two independent messages (the message itself and the
key), with one subject to a secrecy constraint, the most logical
coding scheme is a special class of codes for the discrete mem-
oryless broadcast channel with confidential communications
(t,q,) (DM-BCC(t, q)). While we are the first to notice and use
this specific construction for the purpose of authentication, we
refer to this as Lai’s strategy. Before continuing we discuss the
DM-BCC.
The achievable rate region of the DM-BCC was first de-
rived by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner in [5] and later refined in [6,
Chapter 17]. In said model, there exist three messages that
Alice wishes to send, a common message, m0 ∈ M0 :=
{1, . . . , 2nr0}, that is to be decoded by both Bob and Grı´ma,
a private message, ms ∈ Ms := {1, . . . , 2nrs}, that is to be
decoded by Bob and kept secret from Grı´ma, and finally a
message, m1 ∈ M1 := {1, . . . , 2nr1}, to be decoded by only
Bob, but without a secrecy constraint. Secrecy in this context
is indicated by
I(pZn|Ms , pMs) ≤ n,
where n → 0 as n→∞. Meaning that the information gained
about Ms from Grı´ma’s observations asymptotically vanishes.
All messages have reliability constraints for their intended
recipients. The three messages are jointly coded as Xn and
sent through the channel where Bob observes Y n|Xn, which
is distributed as t⊗n(yn|xn) while Grı´ma observes, Zn|Xn,
distributed as q⊗n(zn|xn).
The triple (r0, rs, r1) is achievable for the DM-BCC(t, q)
if
r0 + rs + r1 ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ) + min (I(tρσ, τ), I(qρσ, τ))
rs ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)− I(qρ, σ|τ)
r0 ≤ min (I(tρσ, τ), I(qρσ, τ)) ,
for some ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ P(U  W) and τ ∈ P(W),
and sets U and W such that |U| = (|X | + 1)(|X | + 3) and
|W| = |X |+3. It can be seen here that secrecy is only possible
when the channel from Alice to Grı´ma’s is not less noisy than
the channel from Alice to Bob.
Lai’s strategy attains authentication capabilities by imple-
menting the coding scheme for the DM-BCC(t, q) in which
Alice’s message is sent as M1 and the key is sent as Ms
while M0 = ∅. If message rates are chosen within the
achievable region above, Bob will decode the message reliably,
satisfying the reliability constraint of an authentication code.
Additionally, since the key is also reliably decoded and each
yn corresponds to only one k, he can declare authenticity
when kˆ = k. The security constraint on Ms = K reduces the
information about the key that is leaked to Grı´ma; the analysis
of our work will determine the degree of effectiveness.
As stated before, non-zero rates are only possible when t is
less noisy than q, i.e. when I(tρ, σ|τ) > I(qρ, σ|τ). To solve
this issue, we return to Simmons’ strategy for the noiseless
case.
B. Simmon’s Strategy
Simmons’ authentication scheme [1] for noiseless channels
breaks down the problem into protecting against two different
attacks, i.e., an impostor formerly referred to as “imperson-
ation” attack and a substitution attack. The attacks differ in
that in the former, Grı´ma attacks without first observing one
of Alice’s transmissions, while in the latter, Grı´ma does. In the
strategy, the code is created by independently and randomly
choosing |K| = 2nκ not necessarily unique subsets of M,
each denoted as M(k) ⊂ M. The size of each subset is
|M(k)| = 2−nκ/2|M| where each element m ∈M(k) corre-
sponds to a single message m˜ ∈ M˜ := {1, . . . , |M| 2−nκ/2}.
Then, to communicate m˜, Alice sends the associated m from
the subset indexed by their shared key, k. Bob authenticates
a message when the observed m is an element of the cor-
rect M(k). The rate of communication in this scheme is
n−1 log2
∣∣∣M˜∣∣∣ = n−1 log2 |M| − κ/2.
Since an observed m can be contained in multiple M(k),
Grı´ma will be unable to immediately infer which key was
used for authentication. In order to launch a successful sub-
stitution attack, Grı´ma must choose an m′ 6= m that is
contained in the sameM(k), however on average there is only
|K| (|M(k)| / |M|)2 = 1 subset that contains both m and m′.
Therefore, he must essentially guess the correct key to fool
Bob which happens with probability 2−nκ/2 since there are, on
average, |K| (|M(k)| / |M|) = 2nκ/2 subsets that contain m.
In terms of an achievable rate region, this scheme can achieve
the triple (n−1 log2 |M| − κ/2, κ/2, κ). Simmons’ strategy,
together with Lai’s strategy, forms the basis for our code.
C. Gungor and Koksal’s Bounds
Inner bounds for the average achievability region of a DM-
ASC(t, q, t˜), have been established by Gungor and Koksal [4].
Specifically, their scheme splits Alice and Bob’s shared key
into two smaller keys, one for authentication (a´ la Lai’s strat-
egy) and one for secrecy. These two keys are then used as the
dimensions in a two dimensional dimensional binning process,
where the codeword corresponding to the triple of messages
and keys is chosen independently. The independent choice over
the secrecy key, though, leaks extraneous information since
there is no need to differentiate between secrecy keys at the
legitimate receiver.
In any case, the set of all achievable (r, α, κ) derived from
their scheme is a subset of
(r, α, κ) ∈
⋃
κ˜∈R+
RG(κ˜) (7)
where RG(κ˜)
:=
r, α, κ : r + κ ≤ I(tρ, τ) + κ˜α− κ≤ −κ˜
α ≤ minν∈P(Z|U) LG(ν, qρ, tρ, κ˜, τ)

(8)
and LG(ν, qρ, tρ, κ˜, τ) = D(ν||qρ|τ) +
|κ˜+ I(tρ, τ)− I(ν, τ)|+. A proof of this can be found
in Appendix A.
IV. AUTHENTICATION CAPACITY REGION
We now present our main theorems and the inner bound
of the average authentication region. First, we present the
minor contribution of characterizing the inner bound of the
authentication region using Lai’s strategy.
Theorem 4.(r, α, κ) :
r + α ≤ I(tρ, στ)
α ≤ minν∈P(Z|U) L(ν; tρ, qρ, σ, τ)
α ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)
α− κ ≤ 0

⊂ CA(t, q, 1), (9)
where L(ν; tρ, qρ, σ, τ) := D(ν||qρ|στ) + |I(tρ, σ|τ) −
I(ν, σ|τ) + |I(tρσ, τ)− I(νσ, τ)|+ |+, for all ρ ∈ P(X|U),
σ ∈ P(U  W), and τ ∈ P(W) where |U| and |W| are
finite.
Proof: See Appendix C, along with the supporting code
construction, message error analysis and type I error analysis
in Appendix F.
The type I error capabilities are limited by the capacity
of the wire-tap channel and if the secrecy capacity is 0,
then no authentication is possible. We now extend Simmons’
strategy and although it will only be applied to the triples
from Theorem 4, the associated code construction makes no
such assumption on the genesis of the original code.
Theorem 5. If (r, α, κ) ∈ CA then (r−β, α+β, κ+2β) ∈ CA,
for all non-negative β < r.
Proof: See Appendix D
Now to obtain our inner bound, we combine Theorems 4
and 5.
Theorem 6.(r, α, κ) :
r + α ≤ I(tρ, στ)
2α− κ ≤ minν∈P(Z|U) L(ν; tρ, qρ, σ, τ)
2α− κ ≤ I(tρ, σ|τ)
α− κ ≤ 0

⊂ CA(t, q, 1), (10)
where L(ν; tρ, qρ, σ, τ) := D(ν||qρ|στ) + |I(tρ, σ|τ) −
I(ν, σ|τ) + |I(tρσ, τ)− I(νσ, τ)|+ |+, for all distributions ρ ∈
P(X|U), σ ∈ P(U  W), and τ ∈ P(W) and |U| and |W|
are finite.
Proof: The proof can be found in Appendix E
This inner bound exhibits a trade-offs between rate, type I
error, and key requirement in information theoretic terms. It
is apparent from the first condition that this scheme requires
communication and authentication share the main channel’s
capacity. As long as minν∈P(Z|U) L(ν; tρ, qρ, σ, τ) is non-
zero, an increase in the length of the secret key provides
a proportional increase in type I error. Whereas when the
condition is zero, an increase in α requires twice the increase
in κ as evident in Simmons’ scheme.
Our scheme also improves over Gungor and Koksal’s inner
bound in this respect, since our scheme does not continue to
unnecessarily leak information when Grı´ma’s channel is less
noisy than Bob’s channel. Instead, in such a case, our scheme
reverts to that of Simmon’s, which is known to be optimal.
V. EXAMPLES
To demonstrate that our inner bound outperforms Gungor
and Koksal’s inner, we provide a few examples and analyses.
While it is easy to see that our inner bound (10) is larger
than Lai’s (9) due to the addition of 2α− κ, we will provide
an explicit example to show that (10) also improves upon
Gungor’s inner bound (8). For clarity, we will examine the
case where t and q are binary symmetric channels (BSC) with
transition probabilities λt and λq respectively.
In a BSC, (10) simplifies to
r + α < I(t, στ)
2α− κ < min
ν∈P(Z|X )
L∗(ν; t, q, σ, τ)
2α− κ ≤ I(t, σ|τ)
α− κ ≤ 0,
where σ is now a distribution on X given W and
L∗(ν; t, q, σ, τ) = D(ν||q|στ) + |I(t, σ|τ) − I(ν, σ|τ) +
|I(tσ, τ)− I(νσ, τ)|+ |+. Meanwhile, (8) simplifies to
RG(κ˜):=
r, α, κ : r + κ ≤ I(t, τ) + κ˜α− κ≤ −κ˜
α ≤ minν∈P(Y|X ) LG(ν, q, t, κ˜, τ)
 ,
(11)
where LG(ν, q, t, κ˜, τ) = D(ν||q|τ) + |κ˜+ I(t, τ)− I(ν, τ)|+.
A. BSC Analysis
The σ and τ that maximize the average region and all
three constraints simultaneously is BSC(.5) and a uniform τ .
Since the upper bound of the third condition is always larger
than the upper bound of the second condition for this set of
distributions, we only focus on the first two conditions. For a
less noisy main channel, the minimum ν is always t, whereas
when the main channel is not less noisy, the minimum ν is
always q, both regardless of Alice’s choice of (σ, τ).
When we consider the case where the adversary’s channel is
“less noisy” than the main channel, it is easy to see that Gun-
gor’s region is not better than the AAR. With such a channel
pair, the condition minν∈P(Z|X ) L∗(ν; t, q, σ, τ) when evalu-
ated at its minimum ν = q, the bound is L∗(q; t, q, σ, τ) = 0.
This results in the condition α < κ/2 for the average region.
In order for Gungor’s strategy to be better, its upper bounds
on α must be greater than κ/2. Examining the third condition
in Gungor’s region, it can been seen that in order to have a
nonzero bound on α, κ˜ > I(q, τ) − I(t, τ) since ν = q is a
valid choice. Then, for both conditions to be greater than κ/2
we must have
κ˜ < κ/2
κ˜+ I(t, τ)− I(q, τ) > κ/2.
These two conditions, however, cannot occur simultaneously
since they imply that κ˜ + I(t, τ) − I(q, τ) > κ˜ which is only
valid when I(t, τ) > I(q, τ). This is only satisfied when t is less
noisy than q which contradicts our original assumption on this
pair of channels. Therefore, given the same κ and assumption
of a less noisy adversary channel, Gungor’s scheme cannot
achieve any α greater than that of our scheme, which implies
that their region is contained in ours. We will show through
example that their region is a proper subset since there are
instances of (r, α, κ) that are contained in the AAR, but not
in theirs.
B. BSC Examples
First, we consider a case when the main channel is less noisy
than Grı´ma’s channel, where in specific λt = .1 and λq = .15.
Fig. 2: AAR outperforms Gungor’s inner bound when α is
large.
Fig. 3: Given an r and κ pair, AAR achieves a greater range
of α for a constant adversarial channel (λt is the transition
probability of channel t).
The trade off between the rate and the authentication, given
a fixed key rate, for both (10) and (8) is plotted in Figure 2.
Note the equivalence of the two regions for small α. As α
increases, though, (10) becomes strictly larger than (8). While
(10) obtains a constant value for r + α, which is equal to
the capacity of t, approximately .531, (8) struggles due to the
inefficiency of their coding scheme. This aligns with intuition,
as (10) uses the channel capacity for authenticity until the
secrecy capacity is exhausted, and then switches to Simmons’
scheme to further the authentication exponent.
Next, in Figure 3, the rate, key requirement, and adversarial
channel are held constant while the maximum possible α
achievable via (10) and (8) is computed for a range of main
channel transition probabilities, λt. Both schemes have a dra-
matic performance decrease when the main channel becomes
worse than the adversarial channel. Still (10) is generally larger
than (8) for many possible main channels. It should be noted
the point where α = 0 is exactly the point where the capacity
of the channel equals .25, in other words both schemes are
using all of the channels capacity simply to provide reliable
communications.
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APPENDIX
A. Proof of Gungor and Koksal’s Region
In order to make a fair comparison to our improved bound, it should be first noted that Gungor and Koksal’s bound as they
presented is incorrect. Specifically, the decoder they define on [4, Pg. 4535], is not the one they use for subsequent analysis.
This is problematic as the mistake actually lets their scheme reliably transmit information at rates above channel capacity!
After correcting this error [4, Theorem 1] shows that to every ρ ∈ P(Y|U), τ ∈ P(U), (κ1, κ2) ∈ R2+ and large enough n
there exists a (r, α, κ1 + κ2, εf,ϕ, n)-AA code where
εf,ϕ≤˙2−n|I(tρ,τ)−r−κ1|+
α=˙ min
ν∈P(Z|U)
D(ν||qρ|τ) + min(κ1, |r + κ1 + κ2 − I(ν, τ)|+)).
In this case, our declaration of intrusion, !, is equivalent to their definition of an erasure, α, in [4]. Thus, εf,ϕ is less than the
superposition of their undetected error and erasure bounds. Note that, since the probability of a successful impostor attack is
always less than that of a substitution attack, we only consider the latter.
These bounds imply that their inner bound is equal to (7), which follows by observing that all (r, α, κ) such that
r ≤ I(tρ, τ)− κ1
κ = κ1 + κ2
α ≤ κ1
α ≤ min
ν∈P(Z|U)
D(ν||qρ|τ) + |r + κ1 + κ2 − I(ν, τ)|+
cause f,ϕ → 0, hence are achievable, and that the last bound can be replaced by
min
ν∈P(Y|U)
D(ν||qρ|τ) + |κ2 + I(tρ, τ)− I(ν, τ)|+ .
Equation (7) comes from applying Fourier Motzkin elimination and removing redundant equations, where κ˜ = k2.
B. Code Construction
The method of types will be used heavily in the code construction proofs related to Lai’s strategy. In order to facilitate
the proofs, we now list a few important properties, but leave derivations to references [6, Chapter 2] or [7, Chapter 11]. For
(yn, xn) ∈ Yn ×Xn, the important properties are,
t⊗n(yn|xn) = 2−n(H(ν|ρ)+D(ν||t|ρ)), (12)∣∣T nµ (xn)∣∣=˙2nH(µ|ρ)+O(log2 n), (13)
t⊗n(T nµ (xn)|xn)=˙2−nD(µ||t|ρ)+O(log2 n), (14)
|Pn(Y,X )|=˙nO(1), (15)
where ν = pyn|xn and ρ = pxn . All orders are determined solely by the cardinalities of support sets. In addition to these well
known properties, we will need the following lemma.
Lemma 7. Let ν ∈ P(Z|U), σ ∈ P(U  W) and τ ∈ P(W). If zn ∈ Tν(un) and un ∈ Tσ(wn), then zn ∈ Tνσ(wn).
Proof: See Appendix H1.
This is necessary since generally zn /∈ Tνσ(wn) when zn ∈ Tν(un) and un ∈ Tσ(wn). Indeed, consider the case where
wn = (0, 0, 1, 1), un = (1, 0, 1, 0) and zn = (0, 0, 1, 1). Clearly ν(0|0) = ν(1|0) = ν(0|1) = ν(1|1) = 1/2 and σ = ν = νσ.
But pzn|w(1|1) = pzn|w(0|0) = 1, and thus pzn|wn 6= νσ.
We now turn to random coding arguments which will be used in the construction of the code. In Lai’s strategy, for example,
a large number of wn will be independently selected uniformly at random from T nτ , where τ ∈ Pn(W), and then for each
wn another large set of un will be independently selected uniformly at random from T nσ (wn), where σ ∈ Pn(U  W). In
order to determine how many values of un are chosen such that yn ∈ T nµ (un) or zn ∈ T nν (un), we first need to introduce the
following Lemma, which is in fact a minor result from Csisza´r and Ko¨rner [6, Lemma 10.1].
Lemma 8. [6, Minor result from Lemma 10.1] Let Un be uniformly distributed over T nσ (wn), for wn ∈ T nτ . If σ ∈ Pn(U 
W) and τ ∈ Pn(W), then
Pr
(
yn ∈ T nµ (Un)
)
=˙2−nI(µ,σ|τ)+O(log2 n)
for any yn ∈ Tµσ(wn).
Proof: See Appendix H2.
The result is useful for both the reliability and security aspects of code construction analysis. In particular, for reliability
it is desirable to have the probability of choosing a Un such that yn ∈ T nµ (Un) be very small, so that a un satisfying that
relationship is unique. On the other hand, it would be desirable to have a large probability of zn ∈ T nν (Un) so that Grı´ma
will have a large number of equally likely codewords associated with his observation. The following lemma helps to meet this
need.
Lemma 9. ([6, Lemma 17.9]) The probability that in k independent trials an event of probability q occurs less/more than
αqk times, according as α ≶ 1, is bounded above by e−c(α)qk where c(α) = α lnα− α+ 1.
In determining the number of sequences of un chosen such that zn ∈ T nν (un), each independent selection of a sequence
can be viewed as a trial. Lemma can be applied effectively regardless of if qk ≶ 1, although the method by which it should
be applied differs. To streamline the analysis, the following corollary of Lemma 9 will be used instead.
Corollary 10. Fix (β, ρ) ∈ R2+ as well as functions f, g : N→ R. Suppose V 2
nβ+f(n)
:= (V1, . . . , V2nβ+f(n)) are independent
random variables that take 1 with probability 2−nρ−g(n) and 0 otherwise. Let
Vˆδ :=
{
v2
nβ+f(n)
:
⌊
2−n|β−ρ|
+−|f(n)−g(n)|−δ
⌋
<
∑
i
1vi=1 ≤ 2−n|β−ρ|
++|f(n)−g(n)|+δ
}
.
For all β, ρ, f and g
Pr
(
V 2
nβ+f(n) ∈ Vˆ2 log2 ne
)
≥ 1− 2e−n
2
4 . (16)
Furthermore, if n(β − ρ) + f(n)− g(n) > 2 log2 n then
Pr
(
V 2
nβ+f(n) ∈ Vˆ2 log2 e
)
≥ 1− 2e−n
2
4 . (17)
Proof: See Appendix H3.
Last, the following lemma will be required in the type I error analysis of our code.
Lemma 11. Let A1, . . . ,Ak be equal-sized subsets of some finite set X (i.e, |A1| = |A2| = · · · = Ak).
k |A1|
maxx∈∪iAi |i : x ∈ Ai|
≤ |∪iAi| < k |A1|
minx∈∪iAi |i : x ∈ Ai|
.
Proof: See Appendix H4.
C. Proof of Theorem 4
Proof:
First, fix a finite U and W , as well as a ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ P(U  W), τ ∈ P(W) such that
min
ν∈P(Z|U)
L(ν; tρ, qρ, σ, τ) > 0.
Also define
τn := argminτ ′∈Pn(W) |τ ′ − τ |
σn := argminσ′∈Pn(UW): if σ(u|w)=0 then σ′(u|w)=0 |σ′ − σ|
∆1,n := max
µ∈P(Y|U)
max
n′>n
|D(µ||tρ|σn′τn′)− D(µ||tρ|στ)|
∆2,n := max
µ∈P(Y|U)
max
n′>n
|I(µ, σn′ |τn′)− I(µ, σ|τ)|
∆3,n := max
µ∈P(Y|U)
max
n′>n
|I(µ, σn′τn′)− I(µ, στ)|
∆4,n := max
ν∈P(Z|U)
max
n′>n
|D(ν||qρ|σn′τn′)− D(ν||qρ|στ)|
∆5,n := max
ν∈P(Z|U)
max
n′>n
|I(ν, σn′ |τn′)− I(ν, σ|τ)|
∆6,n := max
ν∈P(Z|U)
max
n′>n
|I(ν, σn′τn′)− I(ν, στ)|
∆n := max
i∈{1,...,6}
∆i,n,
which will allow us to account for the code construction requiring empirical distributions for τ and σ. For this reason it is
important to note that ∆n goes to zero monotonically. Indeed this is because of the continuity of entropy since σn → σ and
τn → τ .
First we will show that if (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ), where
R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) :=

(r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) :
r − r˜ − rˆ ≤ 0
κ˜− κ ≤ 0
r˜ + κ˜ = I(tρ, σ|τ)− γ1
r˜ + rˆ + κ˜ = I(tρ, στ)− γ2
α− κ˜ < 0
α < minν∈P(Z|U) D(ν||qρ|στ) + |κ∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+

(18)
and
κ∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) = I(tρ, σ|τ)− I(ν, σ|τ)− γ1 + |I(tρσ, τ)− I(νσ, τ) + γ1 − γ2|+ ,
for some strictly positive γ1 and γ2, then (r, α, κ) is achievable. For large enough n, r ≤ rˆ+ r˜ and κ ≥ κ˜, Appendix F1, F2,
and F3 demonstrate the existence of a (r, αn, κ, n, n)-AA code such that
n < max
µ∈P(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|σnτn)+χ log2 n max
(
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(µ,σn|τn)|
−
, 2n|r˜+rˆ+κ˜−I(µ,σnτn)|
−)
(19)
and
αn > min
ν∈P(Z|U)
(
D(ν||qρ|σnτn) +
∣∣∣∣κ˜− ∣∣∣I(ν, σn|τn)− r˜ − |rˆ − I(νσn, τn)|+∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣+
)
− χn−1 log2 n, (20)
where χ is some positive constant only dependent on the cardinalities of Y, X , Z, U and W . As we will show, if
(r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) then n → 0 and α ≤ limn→∞ αn. Thus demonstrating that (r, α, κ) is achievable if
(r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) for some strictly positive γ1 and γ2.
Starting with showing that if (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ), then the RHS of Equation (19) decays to zero. First note
that
n < max
µ∈P(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|σnτn)+χ log2 n max
(
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(µ,σn|τn)|
−
, 2n|r˜+rˆ+κ˜−I(µ,σnτn)|
−)
< max
µ∈P(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|στ)+2∆n+χ log2 n max
(
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(µ,σ|τ)|
−
, 2n|r˜+rˆ+κ˜−I(µ,στ)|
−)
(21)
= max
µ∈P(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|στ)+2∆n+χ log2 n max
(
2n|−γ1+I(tρ,σ|τ)−I(µ,σ|τ)|
−
, 2n|−γ2+I(tρ,στ)−I(µ,στ)|
−)
, (22)
where (21) is by the definition of ∆n, and (22) is because (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ). The µ that maximizes (22) is
independent of n. Observe that if the maximizing distribution, µ, equals tρ, then (22) equals
2−n(min(γ1,γ2))+2n∆n+χ log2 n, (23)
which decays to zero since γ1 and γ2 are strictly positive while ∆n → 0. On the other hand, if the maximizing distribution
is not equal to tρ then (22) is less than
2−nD(µ||tρ|στ)+2n∆n+χ log2 n, (24)
which still decays to zero since D(µ||tρ|στ) is strictly positive and independent of n.
Next we show that α < limn→∞ αn for all (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ). Similar to before, note
lim
n→∞αn = minν∈P(Z|U)
D(ν||qρ|στ) +
∣∣∣∣κ˜− ∣∣∣I(ν, σ|τ)− r˜ − |rˆ − I(νσ, τ)|+∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣+ (25)
= min
ν∈P(Z|U)
D(ν||qρ|στ) +
∣∣∣κ˜− |κ˜− κ∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+∣∣∣+ (26)
= min
ν∈P(Z|U)
D(ν||qρ|στ) + min(κ˜, |κ∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+) (27)
where (25) is because ∆n and χn−1 log2 n go to zero, and (26) is because (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ). Let ν˜ be the
distribution in P(Z|U) which minimizes (27). Now1
α < D(ν˜||qρ|στ) + min(κ˜, |κ∗ν˜(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+) = lim
n→∞αn (28)
1Although tangential to the proof, it should also be observed that α < minν D(ν||qρ|στ) + min(κ˜, |κ∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+) implies α < κ˜ and α <
minν D(ν||qρ|στ) + κ˜∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ).
since
α < κ˜ ≤ D(ν˜||qρ|στ) + κ˜ (29)
and
α < D(ν˜||qρ|στ) + κ˜∗ν˜(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) (30)
by the definition of R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ).
Having shown (r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜, κ˜) ∈ R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) precipitates (r, α, κ) being achievable, we begin the task of finding a
simple characterization of all such triples in
⋃
γ1,γ2,ρ,σ,τ
R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ). Let R∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) be the set of achievable
(r, α, κ) via R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ), for which
R∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) =
(r, α, κ) :
α− κ < 0
α+ r < I(tρ, στ)− γ2
α < I(tρ, σ|τ)− γ1
α < minν∈P(Z|U) D(ν||qρ|στ) + |κ∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+
 (31)
by applying Fourier-Motzkin elimination2 to R(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ).
Next the γ1, γ2 terms can be removed since
R∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) ⊆ R∗(γ∗1 , γ∗2 , ρ, σ, τ) (32)
for any 0 < γ∗1 ≤ γ1 and 0 < γ∗2 ≤ γ2. Thus
∪γ1,γ2 R∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ) = R∗0(ρ, σ, τ) := lim
(γ1,γ2)→(0,0)
R∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ). (33)
To verify Equation (32) we must show that (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗(γ∗1 , γ∗2 , ρ, σ, τ) for any (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ). To that goal,
observe
α+ r < I(tρ, στ)− γ2 ≤ I(tρ, στ)− γ∗2 (34)
and
α < I(tρ, σ|τ)− γ1 ≤ I(tρ, στ)− γ∗1 (35)
for any (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ). Therefore if
α < min
ν
D(ν||qρ|στ) + |κ∗ν(γ∗1 , γ∗2 , ρ, σ, τ)|+ (36)
then (r, α, κ) ∈ R∗(γ∗1 , γ∗2 , ρ, σ, τ). This though must follow since
α < min
ν
D(ν||qρ|στ) + |κ∗ν(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+ (37)
≤ D(ν∗||qρ|στ) + |κ∗ν∗(γ1, γ2, ρ, σ, τ)|+ (38)
≤ D(ν∗||qρ|στ) + |κ∗ν∗(γ∗1 , γ∗2 , ρ, σ, τ)|+ (39)
where
ν∗ = argminν∈P(Z|U)D(ν||qρ|στ) + |κ∗ν(γ∗1 , γ∗2 , ρ, σ, τ)|+ .
D. Proof of Theorem 5
Proof: If (r, α, κ) is averagely achievable, then for each n ∈ N there exists an
(rn, αn, κn, n, n)
average authentication code such that
lim
n→∞ |(rn, αn, κn, n, n)− (r, α, κ, 0, n)|2 = 0.
Therefore, for any β ∈ R, r > β > 0, there exists a n′ ∈ N such that e−n2/4+2nrn < 1/8, rn > β, and 2nβ > n2 for all
n > n′, since rn is converging to a finite r. Thus for some n′ ∈ N and all n > n′ there exists an
(rn − β, αn + β − 4n−1 log2 n, κn + 2β, 2n, n)
average authentication code due to the code construction and analysis of Appendix G. But if n → 0, then 2n → 0. Hence,
this new sequence of codes proves that (r − β, α+ β, κ+ 2β) is averagely achievable.
2In order to obtain these equations, the additional requirements of r, α, κ, rˆ, r˜ and κ˜ being non-negative are needed, these are equations are suppressed
in the presentation.
E. Proof of Theorem 6
By combining Theorem 4 and Theorem 5, (r, α, κ) ∈ CA if there exists a (r, α, κ, r′, α′, κ′, β) ∈ R7+ such that
r = r′ − β
α = α′ + β
κ = κ′ + 2β
β < r′
r′ + α′ < I(tρ, στ)
α′ < min
ν∈P(Z|U)
L(ν; tρ, qρ, σ, τ)
α′ < I(tρ, σ|τ)
α′ − κ′ < 0,
where L∗(ν; t, q, σ, τ) = D(ν||q|στ)+|I(t, σ|τ)−I(ν, σ|τ)+|I(tσ, τ)− I(νσ, τ)|+ |+ for some finite sets U ,W and distributions
ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ P(U  W) and τ ∈ P(W). The set of triples in Equation (10) are obtained by applying Fourier-Motzkin
elimination to remove r′, α′, κ′ and β to this preceding set of equations, and taking the closure.
F. Code construction and analysis for Theorem 4
Given finite sets U andW , distributions ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ Pn(U  W), and τ ∈ Pn(W), constant γ > 0, and large enough
n, the following code construction results in a (r, α, κ, , n)-AA code for DM-ASC(t, q, 1), where
 ≤ max
µ∈P(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|στ)+O(log2 n) max
(
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(µ,σ|τ)|
−
, 2n|r˜+rˆ+κ˜−I(µ,στ)|
−)
,
for all r ≤ r˜ + rˆ, κ ≥ κ˜, and
α ≥ min
ν∈P(Z|U)
D(ν||qρ|στ) +
∣∣∣∣κ˜− ∣∣∣I(ν, σ|τ)− r˜ − |rˆ − I(νσ, τ)|+∣∣∣+∣∣∣∣+ −O(n−1 log2 n),
with the order terms dependent only on the cardinalities of U , W, X , Y and Z
1) Code Construction:
The code construction involves rate splitting. That is the message set M := {1, . . . , 2nr} is represented by the product of sets
M˜ := {1, . . . , 2nr˜} and Mˆ := {1, . . . , 2nrˆ}, such that r˜ + rˆ = r. In other words M = Mˆ × M˜. The set of keys is denoted
K = {1, . . . , 2nκ˜}.
Let U and W be finite and fix ρ ∈ P(X|U), σ ∈ Pn(U  W), and τ ∈ Pn(W).
Key Establishment: Before communication, Alice and Bob jointly select a key, k, uniformly at random from K.
Random codebook generation: Independently for each mˆ ∈ Mˆ, Alice selects a codeword wn(mˆ) uniformly at random from
T nτ . Then, independently for each (mˆ, m˜, k) ∈ Mˆ× M˜×K, Alice independently selects a codeword un(mˆ, m˜, k) uniformly
at random from T nσ (wn(mˆ)).
Encoder: Given Alice observes mˆ, m˜, and has key k, Alice selects codeword xn to transmit according to
f(xn|mˆ, m˜, k) := ρ⊗n(xn|un(mˆ, m˜, k)). (40)
Note then that Y n|Mˆ, M˜ ,K and Zn|Mˆ, M˜ ,K will be distributed (tρ)⊗n(yn|un(mˆ, m˜, k)) and (qρ)⊗n(zn|un(mˆ, m˜, k))
respectively.
Decoder: Given Bob observes yn and has key k, Bob chooses Mˆ ′, M˜ ′ according to the distribution
ϕ(mˆ′, m˜′|yn, k) :=

1 if (tρ)⊗n(yn|un(mˆ′, m˜′, k)) > (tρ)⊗n(yn|un(i, j, l))
∀(i, j, l) ∈ Mˆ × M˜ × K − {(mˆ′, m˜′, k)}
0 otherwise
, (41)
for all (mˆ, m˜, k, yn) ∈ Mˆ × M˜ × K × Yn, and
ϕ(!|yn, k) :=
{
1 if
∑
(mˆ,m˜)∈Mˆ×M˜ ϕ(mˆ
′, m˜′|yn, k) = 0
0 otherwise
, (42)
for all (yn, k) ∈ Yn ×K. That is for a given yn, Bob declares (mˆ′, m˜′) to be the message sent if (tρ)⊗n(yn|un(mˆ′, m˜′, k) >
(tρ)⊗n(yn|un(i, j, k′)) for all (i, j, k′) ∈ Mˆ × M˜ × K − {(mˆ′, m˜′, k)}. If this maximum is not unique, or if the maximum
occurs for k′ 6= k, then ! is declared.
2) Message error analysis:
Let F,Φ be the random variables that represent the randomly chosen encoder and decoder. We will show
EF,Φ(εf,ϕ) ≤ max
µ∈P(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|στ)+O(log2 n) max
(
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(µ,σ|τ)|
−
, 2n|r˜+rˆ+κ˜−I(µ,στ)|
−)
. (43)
In turn then,
pF,Φ ({f, ϕ : εf,ϕ ≥ nEF,Φ(εf,ϕ)}) < n−1 (44)
follows directly from Markov’s inequality.
To aid in proving Equation (43), define sets
D(µ) := {µ′ : H(µ′|στ) + D(µ′||tρ|στ) ≤ H(µ|στ) + D(µ||tρ|στ)} ,
and
E(un, yn) := {uˆn ∈ T nστ : yn ∈ ∪µ′∈D(µ∗)T nµ′(uˆn)} ,
where µ∗ := pyn|un . With these definitions in hand, observe
εf,ϕ =
∑
mˆ,m˜,k,un,yn
2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ)(tρ)⊗n(yn|un) min
 ∑
(i,j,l)6=(mˆ,m˜,k)
1un=un(mˆ,m˜,k)1un(i,j,l)∈E(un,yn), 1
 . (45)
Indeed, if un(mˆ, m˜, k) = un, and there exists a un(i, j, l) ∈ E(un, yn) for some (i, j, l) 6= (mˆ, m˜, k), then an error will occur
since
(tρ)⊗n(yn|un(i, j, l)) = 2−n(H(µ′|στ)+D(µ′||tρ|στ)) ≥ 2−n(H(µ|στ)+D(µ||tρ|στ)) = (tρ)⊗n(yn|un(mˆ, m˜, k))
where µ′ := pyn|un(i,j,l) and µ := pyn|un . Splitting the summation of yn depending on the empirical distribution yn|un leads
to
εf,ϕ =
∑
mˆ,m˜,k,un
∑
µ∈Pn(Y|U)
∑
yn∈T nµ (un)
2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜+H(µ|στ)+D(µ||tρ|στ))
×min
 ∑
(i,j,l) 6=(mˆ,m˜,k)
1un=un(mˆ,m˜,k)1un(i,j,l)∈E(un,yn), 1
 . (46)
It is important to note that the value of µ fixes pyn , since pyn|wn = µσ by Lemma 7, and thus pyn = pyn|wnpwn = µστ .
Having found a formula for εf,ϕ, that EF,Φ[εf,ϕ] is less than∑
µ∈Pn(Y|U)
∑
mˆ,m˜,k,un
∑
yn∈T nµ (un)
2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜+H(µ|στ)+D(µ||tρ|στ))
×min
 ∑
(i,j,l) 6=(mˆ,m˜,k)
EF,Φ
[
1un=un(mˆ,m˜,k)1un(i,j,l)∈E(un,yn)
]
, 1
 , (47)
follows by applying the expectation operator to (46), and then making use of the linearity of the expected value, and that the
expected value of the minimum is less than or equal to the minimums of the expected values. But note that
EF,Φ
[
1un=un(mˆ,m˜,k)1un(i,j,l)∈E(un,yn)
]
= Pr (Un(mˆ, m˜, k) = un, Un(i, j, l) ∈ E(un, yn)) , (48)
where Un(mˆ, m˜, k) is the random variable denoting the un chosen for (mˆ, m˜, k). If mˆ 6= i, then Un(mˆ, m˜, k) and Un(i, j, l)
are independently chosen over T nστ , and thus in this case Equation (48) equals
Pr (Un(mˆ, m˜, k) = un) Pr (Un(i, j, l) ∈ E(un, yn))
= |T nστ |−1
∑
µ′∈D(µ)
Pr(yn ∈ T nµ′(Un))
≤ 2−nH(στ)+O(log2 n)
∑
µ′∈D(µ):µ′στ=µστ
2−nI(µ
′,στ), (49)
by Lemma 8. Note the restriction in Equation (49) is due to the value of µ fixing the value of µστ . Otherwise if mˆ = i, then
Un(mˆ, m˜, k) and Un(i, j, l) must both belong to T nσ (wn(mˆ)). Thus when mˆ = i, Equation (48) equals
Pr (Un(mˆ, m˜, k) = un) Pr (Un(i, j, l) ∈ E(un, yn)|Wn = wn)
= |T nστ |−1
∑
µ′∈D(µ):µ′σ=µσ
Pr(yn ∈ T nµ′(Un)|Un(i, j, l) ∈ T nσ (wn(mˆ)))
≤ 2−nH(στ)+O(log2 n)
∑
µ′∈D(µ):µ′σ=µσ
2−nI(µ
′,σ|τ) (50)
by Lemma 8. As before, the restriction of µ is because µ fixes the value of pyn|wn .
Hence we have EF,Φ[εf,ϕ] is upper bounded by
∑
µ∈Pn(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|στ)+O(log2 n)
 ∑
µ′∈D(µ):µ′σ=µσ
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(µ′,σ|τ)|− +
∑
µ′∈D(µ):µ′στ=µστ
2n|rˆ+r˜+κ˜−I(µ′,στ)|−
 , (51)
from substituting Equations (49) and (50) into Equation (47), and then carrying out the summations. To conclude the proof
we will show that the maximum summand in Equation (51) occurs when µ′ = µ. Because of this
EF,Φ(f,ϕ) ≤ max
µ∈Pn(Y|U)
2−nD(µ||tρ|στ)+O(log2 n) max
(
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(µ,σ|τ)|
−
, 2n|r˜+rˆ+κ˜−I(µ,στ)|
−)
, (52)
since the number of summation terms grows at most polynomial with n. Equation (43) (which is what we set out to prove)
then follows since Pn(Y|U) ⊂ P(Y|U) for all n ∈ N.
Thus we conclude with demonstrating the maximum summand in Equation (51) to occur when µ = µ′. To verify observe
that
D(µ′||tρ|στ) ≤ H(µ|στ)− H(µ′|στ) + D(µ||tρ|στ)
for all µ′ ∈ D(µ), and thus if H(µ′|στ) is greater than H(µ|στ), then D(µ′||tρ|στ) is less than D(µ||tρ|στ). From this our
assumption is proved since
H(µ′|στ)− D(µ||tρ|στ) ≤ max (H(µ|στ)− D(µ||tρ|στ),H(µ′|στ)− D(µ′||tρ|στ)) , (53)
and either H(µ′σ|τ) = H(µσ|τ) or H(µ′στ) = H(µστ) for the summands.
3) Type I error analysis:
Before presenting the sufficient conditions, it is important to observe that the type I error can be simplified to
ωf,ϕ =
∑
zn∈Zn
max
k
p(zn, k). (54)
This follows by directly inserting the optimal ψ ∈ P(Yn|Zn) into the definition of the average type I error. A global maximum
occurs when ψ takes the form ψ(yn|zn) = 1yn=g(zn), where g : Zn → Yn is any function for which∑
k
p(zn, k)ϕ(M|g(zn), k) = max
yn∈Yn
∑
k
p(zn, k)ϕ(M|yn, k),
for all zn ∈ Zn. Thus Equation (54) is valid since ϕ(M|yn, k) = 1 for at most one k by the code construction.
As will be shown later, if
log2 |{(mˆ, m˜, k) : zn ∈ T nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k))}| =˙n
∣∣∣|rˆ − I(νσ, τ)|+ + r˜ + κ˜− I(ν, σ|τ)∣∣∣+ +O(log2 n) (55)
and
log2 max
k
|{(mˆ, m˜) : zn ∈ T nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k))}| =˙n
∣∣∣|rˆ − I(νσ, τ)|+ + r˜ − I(ν, σ|τ)∣∣∣+ +O(log2 n) (56)
for all ν ∈ Pn(Z|U) and zn ∈ ∪mˆ,m˜,kT nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k)), then
ωf,ϕ < max
ν∈Pn(Z|U)
2
−n
(
D(ν||qρ|στ)+
∣∣∣κ˜−|I(ν,σ|τ)−r˜−|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|+|+∣∣∣+)+O(log2 n)
. (57)
We now show that 1−e−n2/4+O(log2 n) lower bounds the probability of randomly selecting a code that satisfies Conditions (55)
and (56). First observe that 1−2 |Z|n e−n2/4 = 1− e−n2/4+O(n) lower bounds the probability that a code is chosen for which
|{mˆ : zn ∈ T nνσ(wn(mˆ))}| =˙2n|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|
++O(log2 n) (58)
for all zn ∈ ⋃mˆ T nνσ(wn(mˆ)). This observation follows because for each mˆ, wn(mˆ) is independently chosen according to a
uniform distribution over T nτ . Hence
Pr (zn ∈ T nνσ(Wn(mˆ))) =˙2−nI(νσ,τ)+O(log2 n)
for all zn ∈ T nνστ by Lemma 8, and therefore 1 − 2e−n
2/4 lower bounds the probability of selecting a code that satisfies
Equation (58) for any zn ∈ T nνστ by Corollary 10. Next, if the values of wn(mˆ) are chosen such that Equation (58) is true
for all zn ∈ ∪mˆ∈MˆT nνσ(wn(mˆ)), then 1 − 4 |K| |Z|n e−n
2/4 lower bounds the probability of a code being selected that also
satisfies Conditions (55) and (56). Indeed for each zn ∈ ∪mˆ∈MˆT nνσ(wn(mˆ)), there will be 2n(r˜+κ˜+|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|
+)+O(log2 n)
values (mˆ, m˜, k) for which un(mˆ, m˜, k) will independently be chosen uniformly at random from a T nνσ(wn(mˆ)) such that
zn ∈ T nνσ(wn(mˆ)). Likewise for each zn ∈ ∪mˆ∈MˆT nνσ(wn(mˆ)) and k ∈ K, there will be 2n(r˜+|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|
+)+O(log2 n) values
(mˆ, m˜, k) for which un(mˆ, m˜, k) will independently be chosen uniformly at random from a T nσ (wn(mˆ)) such that zn ∈
T nνσ(wn(mˆ)). Furthermore, for each of these randomly selected values
Pr (zn ∈ T nν (Un(mˆ, m˜, k))|Wn(mˆ) = wn) =˙2−nI(ν,σ|τ)+O(log2 n)
if zn ∈ T nνσ(wn) by Lemma 8, and 0 otherwise due to Lemma 7. Thus with probability greater than 1 − 2 |Z|n e−n
2/4, the
values of un(mˆ, m˜, k) are chosen that satisfy Condition (55) for all zn ∈ ∪(mˆ,m˜,k)Tν(un(mˆ, m˜, k)) by Corollary 10. Likewise
with probability greater than 1 − 2 |Z|n |K| e−n2/4 the values of un(mˆ, m˜, k) are chosen that satisfy Condition (55) for all
zn ∈ ∪(mˆ,m˜,k)Tν(un(mˆ, m˜, k)) by Corollary 10. Thus, 1− e−n2/4+O(n) must lower bound the probability of choosing a code
that satisfies Conditions (55) and (56) for all ν ∈ Pn(Z|U) and zn ∈ ∪mˆ,m˜,kT nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k)).
We now proceed with showing conditions (55) and (56) cause (57). Set
Znf (ν) := {zn ∈ ∪mˆ,m˜,kT nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k))} .
The type I error for f, ϕ can be bounded as follows:
ωf,ϕ =
∑
zn
2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜) max
k
∑
mˆ,m˜,un
(qρ)⊗n(zn|un)1un=un(mˆ,m˜,k) (59)
≤
∑
zn
2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜) max
k
∑
ν∈Pn(Z|U)
|{(mˆ, m˜) : zn ∈ T nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k))}| 2−n(H(ν|στ)+D(ν||qρ|στ)) (60)
≤ 2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜)
∑
ν∈Pn(Z|U)
∑
zn∈Znf (ν)
max
k
|{(mˆ, m˜) : zn ∈ T nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k))}| 2−n(H(ν|στ)+D(ν||qρ|στ)) (61)
≤ 2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜)
∑
ν∈Pn(Z|U)
∑
zn∈Znf (ν)
2n|r˜−I(ν,σ|τ)+|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|+|++O(log2 n)2−n(H(ν|στ)+D(ν||qρ|στ)) (62)
≤ 2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜) max
ν∈Pn(Z|U)
∣∣Znf (ν)∣∣ 2n|r˜−I(ν,σ|τ)+|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|+|++O(log2 n)2−n(H(ν|στ)+D(ν||qρ|στ)) (63)
where (59) follows from Equation (54) because
p(zn, k) =
∑
mˆ,m˜
p(zn|mˆ, m˜, k)2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜) =
∑
mˆ,m˜,un
(qρ)⊗n(zn|un)1un=un(mˆ,m˜,k)2−n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜),
(60) follows by further sub-dividing the summation based upon pzn|un , and then performing the sum over all (mˆ, m˜, un) for
a fixed pzn|un , (61) is from moving the maximum inside the summation (which does not decrease the value) and recognizing
|{(mˆ, m˜) : zn ∈ T nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k))}| is only non-zero if zn ∈ Znf (ν), (62) is by Condition (56), and finally (63) results from
performing the summation over Znf (ν) and because
∑
ν∈Pn(Z|U) · ≤ |Pn(Z|U)|maxν∈Pn(Z|U) ·.
To finish the proof, observe ∣∣Znf (ν)∣∣ ≤ 2n(rˆ+r˜+κ)2nH(ν|στ)+O(log2 n)minzn∈Znf (ν) |{mˆ, m˜, k : zn ∈ T nν (un(mˆ, m˜, k))}|
by Lemma 11. Hence ∣∣Znf (ν)∣∣ ≤ 2O(log2 n) 2n(rˆ+r˜+κ˜)2nH(ν|στ)
2n|r˜+κ˜−I(ν,σ|τ)+|rˆ−I(νσ,τ)|+|+
(64)
by Condition (55). Equation (57) follows by combining Equations (63) and (64).
G. Code construction and analysis for Theorem 5
Let (f, ϕ) be a code with rate r, block-length n, key requirement κ, and assume r > β > 2n−1 log2 n. The following
construction and analysis guarantees the existence of a code (f ′, ϕ′) if
e−n
2/4+2nr < 1/8.
In specific, if (f, ϕ) is a (r, α, κ, , n)-AA code, then (f ′, ϕ′) will be a
(r − β, α+ β − 2n−1 log2 ne3, κ+ 2β, 2, n)
AA code.
1) Code Construction:
Original code: Let (f, ϕ) ∈ P(Xn|M,K1) × P(M ∪ {!} |Yn,K1) be a code provided to Alice and Bob, where M :=
{1, . . . , 2nr} and K1 := {1, . . . , 2nκ}.
Key Establishment: Before communication, Alice and Bob jointly select a key, (k1, k2), uniformly at random from K1×K2,
where K2 :=
{
1, . . . , 22nβ
}
.
Random codebook generation: Let M′ := {1, . . . , 2n(r−β)}. Alice independently for every k2 ∈ K2 selects a set M(k2)
uniformly at random from the set of all 2n(r−β)-element subsets of M. Next, Alice independently for every k2 ∈ K2 chooses
an invertible mapping gk2 : M′ →M(k2) uniformly at random from the set of invertible mappings on M′ →M(k2). Her
choices are publicly shared.
Encoder:
f ′(xn|m′, k1, k2) := f(xn|gk2(m′), k1)
for all (xn,m′, k1, k2) ∈ Xn ×M′ ×K1 ×K2.
Decoder:
ϕ′(m′|yn, k1, k2) =
{
ϕ(gk2(m
′)|yn, k1) if m′ 6= !
ϕ(!|yn, k) + ϕ(M−M(k2)|yn, k1) otherwise
,
for all (yn, k1, k2) ∈ Yn ×K1 ×K2 and m′ ∈M′ ∪ !.
2) Message error analysis:
The average probability of message error, when averaged over all possible (f ′, ϕ′), is equal to the probability of message error
for (f, ϕ). Indeed, this is because the probability of message error for (f ′, ϕ′) and a given m′, k1, k2 is equal to the probability
of message error of (f, ϕ) for some m, k1 since
εf ′,ϕ′(m
′, k1, k2) = 1−
∑
yn,xn
ϕ′(m′|yn, k1, k2)tn(yn|xn)f ′(xn|m′, k1, k2)
= 1−
∑
yn,xn
ϕ(gk2(m
′)|yn, k1)tn(yn|xn)f(xn|gk2(m′), k1)
= εf,ϕ(gk2(m
′), k1). (65)
Therefore
EF ′,Φ′ [εf ′,ϕ′ ] =
∑
m′∈M′,k1∈K1
2−n(r−β+κ)
( ∑
m∈M
2−nrεf,ϕ(m, k1)
)
= εf,ϕ, (66)
since, for a given k1, the value of m that corresponds to m′ is uniformly chosen over all M×K1. Thus εf ′,ϕ′ < 2εf,ϕ for
at least half of the possible codes due to Markov’s inequality.
3) Type I error analysis:
In order to guarantee
ωf ′,ϕ′ < ωf,ϕ2
−nβ+2 log2 ne3 , (67)
it is sufficient to show
e−22nβ < |{k2 : m ∈M(k2)}| < e22nβ (68)
and
|{k2 : (m, m˜) ∈M(k2)×M(k2)}| ≤ (ne)2, (69)
for all (m, m˜) ∈ M×M. This sufficiency will be proved subsequently, first we discuss the probability of selecting such a
code. Codes which satisfy Equations (68) and (69) for all (m, m˜) ∈ M×M are chosen from the code construction process
with probability greater than
1− 4e−n
2
4 +2nr. (70)
Indeed, with probability 2−nβ a code is chosen such that m ∈M(k2). Similarly with probability
2−nβ
2n(r−β) − 1
2nr − 1 = 2
−2nβ 1− 2n(β−r)
1− 2−nr ,
a code is chosen that satisfies (m, m˜) ∈M(k2)×M(k2). There are 22nβ sets M(k2) that are independently chosen, and by
requirement β > 2n−1 log2 n. Thus for a fixed (m, m˜) ∈M×M, with probability greater than 1− 2e−n
2/4 a code is chosen
e−22nβ < |{k2 : m ∈M(k2)}| ≤ e22nβ
and with probability greater than 1− 2e−n2/4 a code is chosen such that
|{k2 : (m, m˜) ∈M(k2)×M(k2)}| ≤ (ne)2
by Corollary 10. Equation (70) is obtained by using the union bound to consider all (m, m˜) ∈M×M simultaneously.
Next, we show that codes that meet the sufficiency conditions imply the average type I error requirement, but first observe
that ∑
k2:m∈M(k2)
1
|{k2 : m ∈M(k2)}|ωf,ϕ
′(ψ, zn, g−1k2 (m), k1, k2)
=
∑
yn
ψ(yn|zn)
∑
m˜∈M−{m}
ϕ(m˜|yn, k1)
∑
k2:m∈M(k2)
1
|{k2 : m ∈M(k2)}|1m˜∈M(k2) (71)
≤
∑
yn
ψ(yn|zn)
∑
m˜∈M−{m}
ϕ(m˜|yn, k1)n2e42−nβ (72)
= ωf,ϕ(ψ, z
n,m, k1)n
2e42−nβ , (73)
where (71) is because ϕ′(g−1k2 (m)|yn, k1) = ϕ(m|yn, k1)1m∈M(k2), and (72) is by Conditions (68) and (69). The type I error
for (f ′, ϕ′) is
max
ψ
∑
zn,m,k1,xn
q⊗n(zn|xn)f(xn|m, k1)2−n(κ+r+β)
∑
k2:m∈M(k2)
ωf ′ϕ′(ψ, z
n, g−1k2 (m), k1, k2), (74)
where it should be noted the summation is over m ∈M instead of m′ ∈M′. But, if a code satisfies the sufficient conditions (68)
and (69), then ∑
k2:m∈M(k2)
ωf ′,ϕ′(ψ, z
n, g−1k2 (m), k1, k2) < n
2e6ωf,ϕ(ψ, z
n,m, k1) (75)
by Equation 73. Thus (74) is less than
n2e62−nβ max
ψ
∑
zn,m,k1,xn
q⊗n(zn|xn)f(xn|m, k1)2−n(κ+r)ωf,ϕ(ψ, zn,m, k1) = n2e62−nβωf,ϕ, (76)
whence Equation (67).
H. Proofs of Lemma 7, Lemma 8, Corollary 10, and Lemma 11
1) Proof of Lemma 7 :
Proof: First note that
ν(c|b) = pzn|un(c|b) =
∑
a
pzn|un,wn(c|b, a)pwn|un(a|b) = pzn|un,wn(c|b, ab)
where ab is the value such that pun|wn(b|ab) = σ(b|ab) is non-zero. Hence
pzn|wn(c|a) =
∑
b
pzn|un,wn(c|b, a)pun|wn(b|a)
=
∑
b:ab=b
pzn|un,wn(c|b, a)σ(b|a) +
∑
b:ab 6=b
pzn|un,wn(c|b, a)σ(b|a)
=
∑
b:ab=b
ν(c|b)σ(b|a)
= νσ(c|a).
2) Proof of Lemma 8:
Proof: If Un is chosen uniformly over T nσ (wn) then
Pr
(
yn ∈ T nµ (Un)
)
=
∑
un
pUn(u
n)1yn∈T nµ (un) =
∣∣{un : yn ∈ T nµ (un), un ∈ T nσ (wn)}∣∣
|T nσ (wn)|
. (77)
for any fixed yn. The set in the numerator of the RHS of Equation (77) is equal to T nµ¯ (yn, wn) where µ¯(b|a, c)µσ(c|a) =
µ(c|b)σ(b|a). Indeed, all un in the numerator of Equation (77) have a fixed empirical distribution (yn, un, wn) since un
determines wn uniquely. Now consider expanding pyn,un|wn in two ways. First,
pyn,un|wn = pyn|un,wn ◦ pun|wn = µ ◦ σ,
since un determines un. Second,
pyn,un|wn = pun|yn,wn ◦ pyn|wn = µ¯ ◦ µσ,
because pun|yn,wn = µ¯ by definition, and pyn|wn = µσ by Lemma 7. Equating the two expansions and solving for µ¯ gives
µ¯(c|b, a) = µ(c|b)σ(b|a)µσ(c|a) .
Thus
Pr
(
yn ∈ T nµ (Un)
)
= 2n(H(µ¯|µσ◦τ)−H(σ|τ))+O(log2 n) = 2−nI(µ,σ|τ)+O(log2 n) (78)
follows from substituting T nµ¯ (yn, wn) into the numerator of Equation (77) and because
H(µ¯|µσ ◦ τ)− H(σ|τ)
= −
∑
c,b,a
µ¯(b|a, c)µσ(c|a)τ(a) log2 µ¯(b|a, c) +
∑
c,b,a
µ(c|b)σ(b|a)τ(a) log2 σ(b|a)
= −
∑
c,b,a
µ(c|b)σ(b|a)τ(a) log2
µ(c|b)
µσ(c|a)
= −I(µ, σ|τ).
3) Proof of Corollary 10:
Proof: Let V1, . . . , V2nβ+f(n) be IID Bern(2−nρ+g(n)) RVs. Define ∆(n) = |f(n)− g(n)|. If nβ − nρ + f(n)− g(n) ≥
2 log2 n then
Pr
(∑
i
Vi <
⌊
e−12n|β−ρ|
+−∆(n)
⌋)
≤ Pr
(∑
i
Vi < e
−12n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n)
)
< e−(1−2e
−1)2n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n) < e−n
2/4 (79)
and
Pr
(∑
i
Vi > e2
n|β−ρ|++∆(n)
)
≤ Pr
(∑
i
Vi > e2
nβ−ρ+f(n)−g(n)
)
< e−2
n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n)
< e−n
2
(80)
by Lemma 9.
On the other hand, if nβ − nρ+ f(n)− g(n) < 2 log2 n then
Pr
(∑
i
Vi <
⌊
n−22n|β−ρ|
+−∆(n)
⌋)
≤ Pr
(∑
i
Vi < 0
)
= 0 (81)
and
Pr
(∑
i
Vi > n
2e22n|β−ρ|
++∆(n)
)
≤ Pr
(∑
i
Vi < n
2e2
)
= Pr
(∑
i
Vi <
(
n2e2
2n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n)
)
2n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n)
)
< e−n
2e2 (82)
by Lemma 9, and in particular because
c
(
n2e2
2n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n)
)
2n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n) = n2e2 ln
n2e2
2n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n)
− n2e2 + 2n(β−ρ)+f(n)−g(n)
> n2e2 ln
n2e2
n2
− n2e2
= n2e2.
4) Proof of Lemma 11:
Proof:
Write |∪iAi| as the summation of its elements, that is
|∪iAi| =
∑
x
1x∈∪iAi . (83)
From this equation it must also follow that
|∪iAi| =
∑
x
∑
i
1x∈Ai
|{i : x ∈ Ai}| (84)
since
1x∈∪iAi =
∑
i
1x∈Ai
|{i : x ∈ Ai}|
for every x ∈ ∪iAi. Swapping the order of the summations and replacing the denominator with the min or max results in the
Lemma.
